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Abstract 
 
The story of conflict and cooperation has started millions of years ago, and now it is everywhere: 
In biology, computer science, economics, humanities, law, philosophy, political science, and 
psychology. Wars, airline alliances, trade, oligopolistic cartels, evolution of species and genes, and 
team sports are examples of games of conflict and cooperation. However, Nash (1951)’s 
noncooperative games—in which each player acts independently without collaboration with any 
of the others—has become the dominant ideology in economics, game theory, and related fields. 
A simple falsification of this noncooperative theory is scientific publication: It is a rather 
competitive game, yet collaboration is widespread. In this paper, I propose a novel way to 
rationally play games of conflict and cooperation under the Principle of Free Will—players are 
free to cooperate to coordinate their actions or act independently. Anyone with a basic game theory 
background will be familiar with the setup in this paper, which is based on simple game trees. In 
fact, one hardly needs any mathematics to follow the arguments. 
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1.   Introduction 
  
The story of conflict and cooperation has started millions of years ago, and now it is everywhere: 
In biology, computer science, economics, humanities, law, philosophy, political science, 
psychology and so on. Cars cooperate as well as compete in the traffic to get to one place from 
another. Firms, and even countries, form cartels to cooperate among themselves and increase their 
market power, competing with the outsiders. Trade is a game of conflict and cooperation: Sellers 
want a higher price, whereas buyers want a lower price; yet, many people find a settling agreement 
because it is mutually beneficial. Many elections are games of cooperation as well as competition. 
In a judicial process, we may have conflicting interests with the other side, but we also cooperate 
with our lawyer and possibly with officials. Global airplane transportation is a giant competitive 
market, but alliances among airline companies are common—Star Alliance being one of the 
biggest in the world. Many popular sports such as association football, American football, 
basketball, cricket, and volleyball involve competition as well as cooperation.2  
However, Nash’s (1951, p. 286) noncooperative games—in which each player acts 
independently without collaboration with any of the others—has become the dominant ideology 
in economics, game theory, and the related fields. In addition to the aforementioned examples, a 
simple falsification of this noncooperative theory is scientific publication: It is a rather competitive 
game, yet collaboration is widespread. This paper proposes a novel way to rationally play games 
of conflict and cooperation under the Principle of Free Will—players are free to cooperate to 
coordinate their actions or act independently. 
One of the big questions in sciences has been how cooperation has evolved. Somehow, 
evolution has furnished species with an ability to collaborate and compete to survive and pass their 
genes onto the next generations. Conflict and cooperation is widespread in animals including 
humans and other living organisms. Genes, however selfish they may be, engage in cartels. 
Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins coined the term “The Selfish Cooperator,” after having 
noticed that the title of his earlier book, “The Selfish Gene,” might have given a wrong impression 
                                                
2 For competition and cooperation among freight carriers, see, e.g., Krajewska et al. (2008); for more 
examples in multi-agent systems in computer science, Doran et al. (1997); for more applications of game 
theory, Binmore (2007); for sports, Barrow (2012). 
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(Dawkins, 2000; 2006). Since the seminal work of Smith and Price (1973), game theory has been 
developed and extensively applied to biological sciences (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1967; Smith, 1982; 
and, Haigh and Cannings, 1989). 
First World War was fought between a coalition of Allied Powers and Central Powers, in which 
members of each coalition cooperated strategically to defeat the other coalition. The coalition 
members at the beginning of the war were different than the ones at the end, and some even 
changed sides. Payoffs at the end of the war differed among and across coalitions. Russian Empire, 
from the victorious Allied Powers, collapsed, as well as the three losing empires. There were even 
coalitions within coalitions in part because the larger coalition was not that stable. Some countries 
stayed neutral, which can be more beneficial for a player than being in either coalition. An example 
is Switzerland which has been neutral for over two centuries and has arguably benefited from this. 
Chess grandmaster Mamedyarov (world no. 3) recently allegedly admitted that grandmaster 
Karjakin (world no. 10) and him have involved in pre-arranged draws. This reveals that 
cooperation can take place even in a highly competitive game like chess. In chess tournaments, 
two players might benefit from drawing, and if other competitors realize this, then they can change 
their playing strategy towards the cooperating players. It seems that Magnus Carlsen, the current 
World Chess Champion, has already noticed such cooperation between the two grandmasters.3 
I am not the first to study the connections between noncooperative games and cooperative 
games. In fact, von Neumann (1928) studied the maximin solution in a three-person game and 
noticed that two players may benefit from collaboration in zero-sum games. (Note von Neumann’s 
incredible anticipation—the chess tournament mentioned above is an n-person zero-sum game!) 
In modern game theory, however, strategic games are studied under the framework of 
noncooperative games, in which players act independently and collaboration to coordinate actions 
is not possible (Nash, 1951). The framework for cooperative games were developed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Harsanyi (1974)’s extension of this framework led to a recently 
a growing literature that incorporates elements from noncooperative games into cooperative games 
such as farsightedness and backward induction, which has greatly improved our understanding of 
both frameworks and their interrelations. There is a vast literature on coalitions in strategic and 
                                                
3 Chess rankings are as of 31 July 2018. For more information, see: 
https://www.chess.com/news/view/norway-chess-anand-wins-mamedyarov-admits-pre-arranged-draws. 
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nonstrategic contexts; see, e.g., Bloch (1996), Brams et al. (2005), Herings et al. (2009), Ray and 
Vohra (2015), Petrosyan and Zaccour (2016), and Karos and Kasper (2018). 
The main contribution of the present paper is the solution in games of conflict and cooperation, 
which is based on a unique procedure that combines backward induction and forward induction 
reasoning in which players rationally collaborate or act independently.4 Just like credible threats 
play a crucial role in noncooperative games (Schelling, 1980; Selten, 1965; Brams, 1994), they are 
indispensable in determining the stability of coalitions in this framework. I call a threat credible if 
the player or the coalition that make it would rationally carry out the threat.  Moreover, compared 
with more abstract settings, I work on extensive-form games in which players, timing of the game, 
and strategies are specified in a simple game tree like in Figure 1. In that sense, anyone with a 
basic game theory background shall be familiar with the setup of games of conflict and 
cooperation. In fact, one hardly needs any mathematics to follow the arguments in this paper. 
 
2.   Illustrative examples 
 
2.1. Is banning abortion effective? 
It is commonly believed that in noncooperative games there is no external authority to enforce 
certain behavior. In fact, they do require an authority to enforce noncooperative behavior—the 
authority must guarantee that players will not cooperate and coordinate their actions in any way.5 
If a player knows that others can collude against it, then this would potentially change its behavior, 
as the following example illustrates.  
Consider the three-player sequential-move game presented in Figure 1 in which the 
government (Player 1) chooses between making abortion legal or illegal; an individual (Player 2), 
who is considering abortion, chooses between having abortion (Y) or not (N); and, an abortion 
clinic (Player 3) chooses between charging a ‘High’ or ‘Low’ price. Figure 1 illustrates players’  
                                                
4 Backward induction reasoning is based on the assumption that at any point in the game players make 
rational choices taking into account the future only, so they do not draw any conclusions from past choices. 
Forward induction reasoning generally assumes that past choices affect future behavior in a rational way. 
Unlike backward induction, forward induction does not have a unique definition in the literature. For more 
information, see, e.g., Perea (2012). 
5 For further discussion between cooperative and noncooperative games, see, e.g., Serrano (2004). 
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Figure 1. A three-player sequential-move game in which government moves first, the person 
who is considering abortion moves second, and the clinic moves last. 
 
actions and preferences over the outcomes, which are represented by 1, 2, 3, and 4—from worst 
to best. I assume the following preferences in this rather stylized example: 
1.   The government prefers N to Y, and ‘Legal’ to ‘Illegal’ in any situation. 
2.   The individual’s worst outcome is when the choices are ‘Illegal, Y, and H’, whereas her 
best outcome is when the choices are ‘Legal, Y, and L’. Her 2nd most preferred outcomes  
are when the choices are ‘Illegal, Y, and L’ and ‘Legal, Y, and H’, in which case I assume 
that she goes to an alternative clinic with a cheaper price as abortion is legal. She receives 
a utility of 2 if she chooses N. 
3.   The clinic’s worst outcome is when the individual does not have abortion, whereas its best 
outcome is when the choices are ‘Illegal, Y, and H’. When the individual chooses Y and the 
price is L, the clinic prefers ‘Legal’ to ‘Illegal’, so its utility is 3 and 2, respectively. 
If we consider this game as a noncooperative game, its solution can be found by following the 
backward induction procedure: The clinic would choose H on the left node (4 vs. 2) and L on the 
right node (1 vs. 3). Given the clinic’s choice, the individual would choose N and Y on the left and 
right nodes, respectively. Anticipating these choices, the government would choose to make 
abortion illegal. So, the outcome of this solution would be (3, 2, 1). By making abortion illegal, 
the government relies on the assumption that the clinic and the individual will act independently 
and not cooperate and coordinate their moves. However, after the government plays ‘Illegal’, the 
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person and the clinic have an incentive to cooperate because they would prefer outcome (1, 3, 2) 
to (3, 2, 1). So, making abortion illegal does not prevent it from happening because there is a 
mutually beneficial outcome. If the government anticipates that the individual and the clinic will 
coordinate their moves, then it would rather legalize abortion, in which case the outcome will be 
(2, 4, 3). In such cases, I will say that the cooperation between Player 2 and Player 3 would be a 
credible threat—if the government chooses ‘Illegal’, then it will be carried out. 
To give more examples, in some countries, it is illegal to cooperate under certain 
circumstances: oligopolistic cartels, drug dealing, organ trade, forming partnerships—such as 
dating and same-sex couple marriage or partnership—just to name a few.  In these games and other 
games played outside of restricted lab conditions, it is difficult and costly, if not impossible, to 
enforce that players will not exercise their free will to cooperate.  
In addition to encouraging competition, modern society is based on rules that in many ways 
facilitate cooperation, collaboration and coordination among individuals. For example, citizens are 
free to make contracts—a simple e-mail can count as a binding agreement—and engage in 
partnerships such as marriage, employer-employee partnership, management team of a company, 
friendships, and relationships, which are based on formal or informal institutions. 
With that in mind, I assume the Principle of Free Will—players are free to act independently 
or form coalitions to coordinate their actions, which could be via formal or informal institutions 
as mentioned earlier. But I do recognize that the right to exercise free will can be restricted and it 
might be impossible to coordinate actions under certain reasonable situations. If there is an external 
authority that can enforce noncooperative behavior among some players, then this will be part of 
the model so that all players would rationally take this into account. In that sense, a game of conflict 
and cooperation is an extension of a noncooperative game. 
 
2.2. Example 2: The effect of threats and counter-threats 
Figure 2 illustrates a three-player game of conflict and cooperation in which Player 1 (P1) starts 
by choosing L or R. For convenience, I will use pronouns “it” for P1, “she” for P2, and “he” for 
P3. If cooperation were not possible, then the standard backward induction outcome of this game 
would be (5, 5, 3), as is illustrated by step (i) in Table 1. However, this is only the beginning of 
the analysis because in this model players may join forces and form coalitions as long as it is 
mutually beneficial. Members of a coalition coordinate their actions as if they were a single  
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Figure 2. A three-player game of conflict and cooperation. 
 
player. For simplicity, in this example I assume that a coalition prefers more egalitarian outcomes 
to less egalitarian outcomes—i.e., one outcome is preferred to the other if the minimum utility a 
member of the coalition receives from the former outcome is greater than the minimum utility a 
member receives from the latter. For example, a coalition of P1 and P3, if forms, would prefer (6, 
3, 5) to (1, 1, 6). (In section 3, the model allows for more general coalitional preferences.) 
I next solve this game intuitively using a procedure that is based on backward and forward 
induction (BFI) reasoning. (I will define the BFI procedure precisely in section 3.) The outcome 
that will be implemented if no further agreements reached is called a reference point. The initial 
reference point is the backward induction outcome, (5, 5, 3). Step (ii) illustrates the left subgame 
in which it is P2 to make a choice. The backward induction (BI) path in this subgame is a and e, 
whose outcome is (5, 5, 3). But if P2 uses the following forward induction (FI) reasoning and finds 
a mutually beneficial outcome, then she might convince P3 to form a coalition, as they would have 
the full control of the outcome in this subgame. Note that both P2 and P3 prefer (1, 6, 4) to the 
reference point, (5, 5, 3). Thus, P2 and P3 will rationally get together and play b and h, because it 
is mutually beneficial. This overrides the backward induction outcome, and, therefore, the 
reference point is updated to (1, 6, 4). 
But what if P1 anticipates that if it plays L, then P2 and P3 will collaborate against it? Then, 
the initial BI action, L, may not be optimal any more (as we have seen in Example 1), so it may 
need to update its decision based on the new reference point in which it receives a payoff of 1. 
Indeed, if P1 chooses R then the outcome would be (2, 2, 6), which is preferred to the last reference   
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(i). The backward induction outcome is (5, 5, 3), 
which is also the first reference point. 
(ii). 1st coalition forms: Looking forward, 
P2 forms a coalition with P3 to play b and 
h. This overrides the BI outcome, so the 
new reference point is (1, 6, 4). 
Table 1. Steps (i) and (ii) are illustrated. Dashed lines represent individual independent best 
responses, whereas thick solid lines represent coordinated best responses. One can find the 
outcome at each step by following the arrows. 
  
(iii). P1 anticipates the coalition of P2 and P3 
and hence revises its strategy to R as 2 > 1. The 
new reference point is (2, 2, 6). 
(iv). Coalition {2, 3} breaks down, so new 
partnerships are sought. P1 and P2 cooperate to 
play L and a to receive 5 each, which is better 
than 2 each at the last reference point. The new 
reference point is, once again, (5, 5, 3). 
Table 2. Steps (iii) and (iv) are illustrated. 
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point, (1, 6, 4). Step (iii) illustrates this situation. Therefore, P1’s new best response is R, and the 
new reference point becomes (2, 2, 6).6 
Next, having figured out what would happen if P1 acts independently, it needs to check using 
FI reasoning whether there are any collaboration opportunities. Notice that P1 would like to form 
a coalition with P3 to obtain the outcome (6, 3, 5), but P3 would reject such an offer because he 
receives 6 from the current reference point, (2, 2, 6). P1 could threaten to play L, thereby decrease 
P3’s payoff; however, this threat would not be credible because P1 would not rationally carry out 
its threat: It would receive 1 (as opposed to 2) as we have concluded in step (ii). Actually, P3 
would not be interested in forming a coalition with any player because it receives its highest payoff 
at (2, 2, 6). I next check whether P1 and P2 can do better by forming a coalition, which is illustrated 
in step (iv). Notice that if P1 and P2 get together and play L and a, then P3 would best respond to 
this choice by e. The resulting outcome, (5, 5, 3), is better for P1 and P2 than (2, 2, 6). Therefore, 
P1 and P2 form a coalition, which breaks down the alliance between P2 and P3 in this subgame. 
The new reference point is, one more time, (5, 5, 3). 
But this is not the end of the analysis because P3 anticipates that in case he does not act, the 
outcome will be (5, 5, 3). Remember that P1 by itself could not credibly threaten P3; however, its 
forming a coalition with P2 has sent P3 a credible threat, which brings P3 back to the “bargaining 
table.” P3 would seek to form a coalition with P1 to possibly get (6, 3, 5), which is mutually 
beneficial. The agreement would be that if P1 plays R, then P3 would play l: P2’s choice would be 
d because she would receive 3, whereas if she plays c, then she would get at most 2. Step (v) in 
Figure 3 illustrates the backward induction outcome, (6, 3, 5), when P1 and P3 cooperate. This is 
the last reference point and the final outcome because no other coalition including the grand 
coalition can do better. 
A complete solution of this game can be summarized by a list of players, stable coalitions, 
and their strategies: [(1, 3), 2:	  𝑅, {𝑎, 𝑑}, {𝑒, 𝑔, 𝑗, 𝑙}],	  
in which P1 and P3 form a coalition, P1 chooses R, P2 chooses a and d, and P3 chooses e, g, j,  
                                                
6 Note that I have jumped one step. Specifically, I should also have checked whether P2 and P3 would form 
a coalition in the right subgame. This would not be possible because P3, by playing independently, already 
receives its greatest payoff in this subgame, so he would not be willing to form a coalition. 
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Figure 3. Step (v): A coalition breaks down once again. P1’s forming a coalition with P2 was a 
credible threat, which brings P3 back to the “bargaining table.” Anticipating that his payoff will 
be 3, P3 forms a coalition with P1: P1 will play R and P3 will play l. P2 is not happy about this 
but his best response is d against the coalition. As a result, (6, 3, 5) is the final outcome because 
no other coalition including the grand coalition can do better.  
 
and l, from left to right. The outcome of this solution is (6, 3, 5). It is notable that during the 
solution process we have seen that all coalitions—{1 ,2}, {2, 3}, and {1, 3}—except the grand 
coalition rationally formed, though the only stable coalition turned out to be the one between P1 
and P3.7 As a result, we have obtained that the only “stable” coalition is the one between P1 and 
P3. 
At the outset, it might be tempting to conclude—without running the (BFI) procedure—that 
P1 and P3 will obviously form a coalition to obtain (6, 3, 5). However, this conclusion would be 
false. To give an example, consider the game in Figure 2 in which, all else being equal, outcome 
(3, 1, 2) is replaced with outcome (3, 4, 3). This change seems to be irrelevant because P1 and P3 
can still form a coalition to obtain (6, 3, 5). However, the outcome of the new game based on the 
same procedure would be (5, 5, 3), which is significantly different than the previous outcome—
why is this? This is because P2 has now a credible threat against the coalition of P1 and P3. Notice 
that if P1 plays R, then P2 will respond by c, knowing that the coalition would choose i that leads 
                                                
7 Of course, another interpretation could be that first this process occurs in the minds of the players, and 
then they form coalitions. 
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to the more egalitarian outcome, (3, 4, 3), as I assumed in the example.8 Because the reference 
point in step (iv) was (5, 5, 3), it would not be individually rational for P1 to collaborate with P3, 
given P2’s credible threat. As a result, the solution of this game can be summarized [(1,2):	  𝐿, {𝑎, 𝑐}, {𝑒, 𝑔, 𝑗, 𝑘}],	  
in which P1 and P2 form a coalition, P1 chooses L, P2 chooses a and c, and P3 chooses e, g, j, and 
k, from left to right. The outcome of this solution is (5, 5, 3). A credible threat by P2 has prevented 
P3 destabilizing the coalition of P1 and P2. 
 
3.   Games of conflict and cooperation 
 
The framework is finite extensive-form games with perfect information.9 An n-person game of 
conflict and cooperation is a game in extensive-form which consists of a set of players, 𝑁 ={1, 2, … , 𝑛}, their preferences represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, a rooted game 
tree (as in Example 1), and two additional properties: 
i.   A set that describes which players cannot form coalitions with which players, consistent 
with the Principle of Free Will. The chance player, if any, cannot form any coalition. 
ii.   For each possible coalition, a value function as a function of each player’s utility in the 
coalition, representing von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences of the coalition. 
I assume that the full description of the game is common knowledge. When a coalition forms 
at a node x in the game tree, the cooperators coordinate their actions in accordance with the 
preferences given by the value function of the coalition. The value function can also be interpreted 
as the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of an auxiliary player who acts on behalf of the coalition. 
For illustrative purposes, I assumed in the example that a coalition weakly prefers one outcome to 
the other if every member of the coalition weakly prefers former to the latter. But the value function 
may capture very different coalitional preferences (with or without transferable payoffs) in general. 
                                                
8 In this example, for simplicity I assume that payoff transfers are not possible, but even if it were, one 
could construct a similar example. 
9 Any basic textbook in game theory covers extensive-form games with perfect information; see, e.g., 
Peters (2015). Perfect information means that at any point in the game players know what happened in the 
past. 
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As mentioned earlier, a game of conflict and cooperation is an extension of a game in 
extensive-form in which I assume the Principle of Free Will—players may act independently, form 
coalitions to coordinate their actions, and decide which coalitions to form. If there is an external 
authority that can enforce that no one can cooperate with anyone, which would be described in the 
set in (i), then a game of conflict and cooperation reduces to a noncooperative game in extensive 
form. 
I say that a node is labeled if a utility vector is associated with it. In an extensive-form game, 
only the terminal nodes are labeled. As is standard, I define a subgame of a game at a node x as a 
game that includes x and all its successors. Note that a game is a subgame of itself. A coalition is 
called individually rational if every member of the coalition prefers to be in the coalition to the 
reference point, which is implemented if the specific coalition does not form. I next give a 
mathematical algorithm or a logical procedure that can be used to label all nodes including the 
initial node or the root of the tree when the finite procedure halts. I call this Backward-Forward 
Induction (BFI) or Mixed Induction (MI) algorithm, because it is based on the recursive application 
of a combination of backward induction and forward induction reasoning until it returns an 
outcome. 
 
Definition 1 (Backward-Forward Induction Algorithm). The BFI algorithm for solving a finite 
perfect-information game of conflict and cooperation in extensive-form is defined by the following 
procedure. 
1.   Let i be the player who is active at an unlabeled node x such that its immediate successors are 
labeled. Define the reference point as the utility vector associated with the choice of Player i 
such that it maximizes i’s utility at x. 
a.   If i’s utility-maximizing choice leads to a terminal node, then label x with the reference 
point, and go to Step 3. 
b.   Otherwise, go to Step 2. 
2.   Given the reference point at node x, players look forward (i.e., down the tree) and seek ways 
to form a coalition with or against Player i.10  
                                                
10 Players know that if no more coalitions are formed, then the outcome will be the reference point, which 
can be interpreted as the disagreement point. 
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a.   For every coalition containing i, apply a new BFI procedure to the subgame starting 
at node x with the condition that the coalition containing i forms. Note the outcome of 
each BFI procedure from worst to best for i, 𝑐;, 𝑐<, … , 𝑐=. Go to (b). 
b.   Find, if any, the smallest j such that 𝑐> is individually rational for every member of its 
coalition with respect to the reference point. Then, update the reference point with 𝑐>, 
and repeat (b). If such j does not exist, label x with the reference point, and go to Step 
3. 
3.   Repeat Step 1 and Step 2 unless all the nodes have been labeled, in which case stop the 
algorithm. 
 
Step 1 includes backward induction reasoning and Step 2 includes forward induction reasoning 
as well as a recursive sub-step in which the algorithm travels back-and-forth in the tree. Applying 
a new BFI procedure means running the same algorithm independently of the results we have 
obtained so far in the preceding algorithm. Just like the BI outcome, there may be more than one 
BFI outcome. This is because there may be more than one choice that maximizes a player’s or a 
coalition’s payoff at a given node, in which case any of them can be chosen (ties broken 
arbitrarily). 
I call a coalition stable if it survives the BFI procedure; otherwise I call it unstable. For 
example, coalition of {1, 2} in Example 2 is unstable because a stable coalition of {1, 3} forms 
against it, as I have showed. As defined earlier, a coalition is individually rational if every member 
of the coalition prefers to be in the coalition to the reference point. A coalition may be individually 
rational but not stable. Members of the coalition can be better off with the coalition than the 
reference point, but there may be another coalition opportunity which could arise only if the former 
individually rational coalition forms, which destabilizes itself. 
A (BFI) equilibrium of a game of conflict and cooperation consists of the strategies of players 
and stable coalitions that give rise to the outcome obtained by the BFI procedure. Equilibrium 
strategies, stable coalitions and their strategies can be identified by keeping a record of them when 
the original algorithm runs at the root of the game tree till the end of the algorithm. This notion is 
based on the equilibrium ideas of Cournot (1838), von Neumann (1928), von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), Nash (1951), and Selten (1965). 
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The Backward-Forward Induction equilibrium concept is fundamentally different from the 
standard backward induction solution or subgame perfect equilibrium in at least one aspect. A 
central feature of subgame perfect equilibrium is that it constitutes an equilibrium in every 
subgame. However, a BFI equilibrium does not constitute a BFI equilibrium in every subgame.11 
This is because it is based on not only backward induction reasoning but also forward induction 
reasoning; as such the agreements that have been made in the past affect the future plans of players 
and coalitions in a rational way.  
 
Theorem 1. There exists a BFI outcome and equilibrium in every finite n-person perfect-
information game of conflict and cooperation. 
 
Proof. The BFI procedure is well-defined because the game is finite—there are finitely many 
players and finitely many pure strategies. Therefore, it is guaranteed to terminate because all 
terminal nodes are labeled in the beginning. Step 1 is the standard backward induction procedure, 
so it does not need an explanation. Step 2 needs some elaboration. Note that this step is recursive 
in that it calls for a new BFI algorithm to be run and potentially repeated. Then, the outcome of 
the new algorithm will be compared with the reference outcome. This recursive procedure will 
also end after finitely many steps because there are finitely many players and each time the BFI 
procedure is at Step 2a, the number of players will (weakly) decrease due to forming coalitions. 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 1 shows that every finite game of conflict and cooperation has an equilibrium in pure 
strategies and an associated outcome. Note that players cannot improve their payoff by switching 
their strategy unilaterally, coalitions are individually rational and stable—each member of the 
coalition gets more than he or she would get otherwise. 
 
4.   Conclusions 
 
Games of conflict and cooperation include wars, airline alliances, and scientific publication. I 
                                                
11 In Example 2, recall that P2 and P3 form a coalition in the left subgame as described in step (ii), yet in 
the BFI equilibrium of the game the only stable coalition is the one between P1 and P3. 
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propose a solution in such games, which is based on a unique procedure that combines backward 
and forward induction reasoning in which players act independently or cooperate in a rational way. 
A Backward-Forward Induction (BFI) equilibrium is a list of strategies and stable coalitions such 
that independent players do not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally and coalitions are 
individually rational and stable in the sense that their members prefer to be in the coalition than be 
out of the coalition. Credibility of threats and counter-threats by individuals and coalitions play a 
crucial role in determining the stability of coalitions in this setting. 
The BFI concept is fundamentally different from the standard backward induction solution or 
subgame perfect equilibrium in at least one aspect. Unlike subgame perfect equilibrium, a BFI 
equilibrium does not constitute a BFI equilibrium in every subgame. This is because, in addition 
to backward induction reasoning, forward induction reasoning plays a key role in the BFI 
procedure: Players and coalitions draw rational conclusions from the agreements that have been 
made, which rationally affect their future plans. 
Traditionally, noncooperative games were extended first to imperfect-information games 
(Selten, 1965) and then to incomplete-information games (Harsanyi, 1967). I believe that the 
model in this paper and the associated Backward-Forward Induction concept can be extended to 
more general settings in an analogous way. But I feel that this is a nontrivial task and it is beyond 
the scope of this text. 
I believe that a number of fields may benefit from applications of the model in this paper. A 
political scientist may apply the model to conflict and cooperation among countries, a computer 
scientist to multi-agent systems, a biologist to evolution of species and genes, an ethologist to 
animal behavior, an operations researcher to freight carriers, and an economist to examples such 
as airline alliances and oligopolistic cartels. Although Example 2 helps us to illustrate several 
points about the setup and solution, it is rather artificial. More insightful examples from these 
disciplines would be welcome. 
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